. We thus argue partly for a return to the E-type strategy (along with Heim 1990) but maintain the need for unselective binding in UG (cf. Kratzer 1989 , Chierchia 1992 . It is further shown that these two para digms do not differ with respect to the proportion problem and the distribution of symmetric and asymmetric readings of Kadmon (1987) , though they differ with respect to V and 3 readings (discussed in Chierchia 1992) in a non-trivial way that provides further support for the proposed approach. Finally, evidence is given that the bare conditionals should be kept apart from correlative constructions in languages like Hindi, and treated differently from the latter.
Introduction
The treatment of donkey sentences has been the center of much debate since the topic was introduced to linguists in the early '80s. Central to this debate is the question of the status of the pronouns and the indefinite NPs with which they are related in « sentence like (1):
(1) If a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
Take the pronoun it, for example. It has an indefinite NP as its "antecedent,"
which, on the traditional Russellian analysis, is an existential quantifier.
However, it is not a true bound variable because as an existential quanti fier the indefinite NP in the antecedent clause clearly does not have scope over it and hence cannot bind it. Two prominent solutions to this paradox have been proposed. Evans (1980) adopted the Russellian view of the indefinite as a quantifier and denied the bound-variable status of the pronoun. Heim (1982) and Kamp (1981) , on the other hand, developed an alternative theory, within the framework of their Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), which maintains the bound-variable status of the pronoun, but denies the status of the indefinite as an existential quantifier. According to Evans (1980) , the pronouns he and it in (1) belong to a distinct category, called E-type pronouns, whose status is more on a par with definite descrip tions than true variables (see also Cooper 1979 and Parsons 1978 for earlier suggestions to the same effect). The role played by the E-type pronouns is that of referring "to the object(s), if any, which verify the antecedent quantifier-containing clause" (p. 340). According to this analysis, a sentence such as (2a) can be interpreted as (2b):
(2) a. If a man enters the room, he will trip the switch.
b. If a man enters the room, the man who enters the room will trip the switch.
Evans uses the sentences in (3a) and (3b) to show a clear contrast between bound pronouns and E-type pronouns:
(3) a. Few congressmen admire only the people they know.
b. Few congressmen admire Kennedy, and they are very junior.
The pronoun they in (3a) is bound by the quantifier phrase few congressmen which c-commands it. In contrast, the pronoun they in (3b) is not bound by the quantifier phrase since the latter does not c-command the former.
(4) a. No congressmen admire only the people they know.
b.*No congressmen admire Kennedy, and they are very junior.
(5) a. No donkey likes a fanner to beat it.
b.*If a farmer owns no donkey, he beats it.
• . This is a natural consequence of the E-type analysis, since the meaning of an E-type pronoun is simply not compatible with having a negative quan tificational expression as an antecedent. As Evans states, E-type pronouns refer to "the objects that verify the antecedent quantifier-containing clause,"
and "the truth of the clause containing them requires that all the relevant objects satisfy the predicate, ..." In the case of the quantifier no donkey, no member of the set {x| donkey (x)> satisfies the antecedent predicate, so a pronoun (as a definite description, which presupposes the existence of at least one member that satisfies the predicate) is inappropriate. For a similar reason, this analysis explains why an E-type pronoun must take the plural form if the antecedent is a universal quantifier, though this is not required of a true bound variable:
(6) a. Every donkey fears that its/?their owner will beat it/?them.
b. If a farmer owns every donkey, he will beat them/*it.
Since there is no unique donkey that can alone make the antecedent clause true in (6b), a singular pronoun or definite description (which presupposes the existence of such a singleton set) is inappropriate.
In Evans' analysis, the indefinite antecedent of a donkey pronoun is treated as a standard quantifier, much as quantifiers like no one, everyone are. The donkey pronoun itself is treated in a unified way regardless of the quantificational type of its antecedent.
In the DRT analysis of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) , on the other hand, an indefinite NP such as a donkey or a farmer is taken to be something (i) No one came. They all stayed home.
(ii) I saw no first-year student at the meeting. They went to the party instead.
Compare (iii) with the example in (4b):
(iii) No congressmen admire Kennedy. They all admire Jefferson.
The contrast between (iii) and (4b) in fact shows that the pronoun in (iii) is not an E-type pronoun. The E-type pronoun in (4b) has the denotation 'the congressmen who admire Kennedy'; this set is null and thus the sentence is ungrammatical. In other words, the pronoun they takes no one as its antecedent. Now consider the pronoun in (iii). It does not have the same denotation. Instead, it denotes 'the congressmen who do NOT admire Kennedy', which is not a null set. That is, the pronoun they in this case does not take no one as its antecedent.
Hence, the examples here are not counterexamples to Evans' claim. without inherent quantificational force, as it exhibits quantificational variability under adverbs of quantification (Lewis 1975) . Thus the indefi nites in (1) may appear to have the quantificational force of all, most, and some in the context of always, usually, and sometimes, respectively:
Always, if a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it. =A11 farmers (x) and donkeys (y) are such that if x owns y, then x beats y.
(8) Usually, if a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it. =Most farmers (x) and donkeys (y) are such that if x owns y, then x beats y.
(9) Sometimes, if a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
=Some farmers (x) and donkeys (y) are such that x owns y, then x beats y.
According to the DRT analysis, the indefinite is taken not to be a quanti fier, but itself a variable bound by an adverb of quantification, from which it derives its quantificational force. In the absence of an overt adverb of quantification, Heim assumes that both the indefinites (qua variables) and the pronouns (also variables) are unselectively bound by an implicit neces sity operator associated with conditionals, which expresses conditional necessity and contributes universal force. The pronouns share the same index as the indefinite NPs and are thus anaphorically related to them:
(10) Necessarily¡ s, if a farmer¡ owns a donkeyj, he¡ beats itj.
Given the universal force of the necessity operator, the interpretation of the sentence can be represented as in (11) In the Heim-Kamp approach, then, not only the pronouns but also the indefinites that antecede them are treated as true bound variables. It is worthwhile to note that only indefinites and the donkey pronouns that take indefinite antecedents are treated as bound variables. Inherent quantifiers like everyone, no one are still treated as generalized quantifiers in the standard way, and donkey pronouns that are related to them (e.g. everyone)
would presumably still be treated along some variant of an E-type analysis.
In other words, there is no unified treatment of the donkey pronoun across the various quantification types of its antecedents.
There has been considerable research on the issue since the debate was introduced more than a decade ago. Some important problems facing these proposals were discussed by Kadmon (1987 Kadmon ( , 1990 , Pelletier and Schubert (1989) , and Neale (1991) . More recently, Heim (1990) herself showed that some of the problems posed by an E-type analysis of donkey pronouns are in fact solvable within the same analysis (augmented by the concept of minimal situation),2 and that unselective binding does not fare better than an E-type analysis in solving certain problems.3 Heim (1990) then argues, in effect, for a return to the traditional E-type analysis. On the other hand, there are two proponents of a mixed approach, namely Kratzer (1989) and Chierchia (1992) . Kratzer (1989) shows that the 'proportion problem' brought about by the Kamp-Heim approach can be solved by the E-type strategy. However, the E-type strategy leads to the uniqueness problem.
To solve the problem associated with the E-type strategy, Kratzer proposes a mixed analysis which utilizes the Kamp-Heim approach within the E type strategy (see Kratzer 1989 for details). Chierchia (1992) develops a dynamic binding approach, which also has the property of mixing a Kamp Heim approach and the E-type pronoun strategy.
In this paper, we investigate conditional sentences with donkey anaphora in Mandarin Chinese and show that two distinct types of conditional donkey sentences must be recognized. We argue that the first type of donkey sentence (the bare conditionals) is a case of unselective binding par excellence, whereas the other type (the ruguo-and dow-conditionals) is best analyzed in terms of an E-type analysis -as the two types exhibits 2 Although the property of quantificational variability under adverbs of quantification has often been taken to be the main argument for unselective binding (Nishigauchi 1990 , Diesing 1992 , the real argument, as Heim (1990) points out, lies in the fact that an E-type analysis of a donkey pronoun carries with it a uniqueness presupposition, given Russell's analysis of definite descriptions as entailing both existence and uniqueness. The problem occurs with sentences like (i):
(i) If a man is in Athens, he is not in Rhodes.
The E-type analysis of he entails that for the sentence to be false, there has to be a unique man in Athens who is also in Rhodes. But under this interpretation the sentence will always be true (or without a truth value) since there is no unique man in Athens. This interpreta tion is clearly wrong, as speakers have no problem identifying the truth conditions of the sentence: it is false if any man is ever found to be both in Athens and Rhodes and true otherwise.
Heim (1990) shows that the problem of uniqueness presupposition can be overcome by the assumption that there is quantification over minimal events (situations) in the matrix clause, in addition to existential quantification, within the E-type analysis, in the embedded antecedent clause. Thus, (i) is interpreted as "For every minimal situation where exactly one man is in Athens, there cannot be another minimal situation where the unique man in Athens is also in Rhodes." 3 For example, both approaches face the 'proportion problem', discussed below in section 5. properties that respectively match the predictions made by these two approaches in great detail. The evidence presented here sheds light on the current debate regarding donkey anaphora. Our conclusion is that both unselective binding and E-type strategies are justified for natural language (and hence also both the notion of an indefinite as a variable and the notion of it as a generalized quantifier), but perhaps not for the types of constructions that have been studied in English. We concur with Heim (1990) that an E-type analysis would be appropriate (with certain aug mentations as has been suggested) for the type of conditional donkey sentences that have been considered in English, but argue that there is also reason to resurrect the analysis of unselective binding she proposed in Heim (1982) . In this respect our conclusion concurs with that of Kratzer (1989) and Chierchia (1992) in spirit, though it should be clear later that our approach is not strictly 'mixed', particularly when the first type of donkey sentences are considered. In line with recent works, we show that the unselective binding strategy does not differ from the E-type strategy with respect to the proportion problem and the distribution of 'symmetric' and 'asymmetric' readings (Kadmon 1987, 1990 , inter alia) as it shows up in both kinds of donkey sentences in Chinese. Furthermore, the distri bution of the V vs. 3 reading (as discussed in Chierchia 1992) clearly distinguishes the bare conditionals from the rwgwo-conditionals. Finally, we briefly consider a tempting alternative to assimilate the bare conditionals to correlative constructions in languages like Hindi, but show that the assimilation is undesirable on the level of syntactic analysis, as they belong to very different species.
Donkey Sentences in Chinese
In Mandarin Chinese, conditional sentences with the appearance of donkey sentences may involve a wA-word in the antecedent clause and something anaphoric to it in the consequent clause. Mandarin exhibits three such types on the surface: bare conditionals, ¿tow-conditionals, and ruguo-con ditionals. These three types fall into two descriptive paradigms: the bare conditionals on the one hand, and the dou-and rwguo-conditionals on the other. As we shall see, these two paradigms exhibit complementary prop erties, in that donkey anaphora in the former can only take the form of a wA-word in the consequent clause, disallowing all other forms, whereas the latter excludes just wh-words from serving as donkey pronouns, per mitting all other anaphoric forms. We see in (12) that the presence or absence of jiu 'then' does not entail any difference in interpretation. There are two wA-words in the sentence, one in the antecedent clause, the other in the consequent clause. As indi cated in (13), the wA-word in the consequent clause cannot be replaced by an overt pronoun (13a), a null pronoun (13b), or a definite NP (13c).5
Furthermore, there must be an element that can refer back to the wA-word in the antecedent clause, or the sentence would be ill-formed, as in (13d).
The sentences in (14) show the same point as (13a) through (13d); they differ only with respect to the location of the wA-word and the anaphoric elements under consideration. We will discuss these examples in section 3.3. For the moment, we observe that in those sentences in which a pronoun/w/z-word alternation is possible, the consequent clause must contain the adverbial element jiu 'then'. In the absence of this element, the conditional is "completely bare" and no pronoun/w/z-word alternation is possible: Zaefferer (1990) . 7 It appears that the occurrence of a null pronoun is less acceptable than an overt pronoun.
We will not discuss the differences in detail because that would lead us to a different topic, namely, the differences between overt and null pronouns, which have been studied at length (see e.g., Huang 1984). As an attempt to answer the questions posed in (24), we propose that both unselective binding and E-type pronoun strategies are involved in donkey anaphora. In particular, the bare conditionals are cases of unselecdve binding par excellence, whereas the other two kinds of conditionals have E-type pronouns.
Unselective Binding: Bare Conditionals
The properties exhibited in bare conditionals can be summarized as follows:
(25) Properties of bare conditionals a. The donkey anaphor must take the form of a wA-word.
b. The donkey wA-word must be identical to the wA-word in the antecedent clause.
c. There must be an element in the consequent clause referring back to the wA-word in the antecedent clause.
To explain this array of properties, we assume, following Cheng (1991 , 1995 ) (cf. Li 1992 , that wA-words in Chinese are polarity items -indefi nite NPs which do not have inherent quantificational force but instead acquire their quantificational force in context, through the external element(s) that license and/or bind them (see also Heim 1982 and Nishigauchi 1990 ). In the case of bare conditionals, which lack an overt licenser for wA-words, we assume that these are licensed and bound by an implicit necessity operator. Along the lines of Heim's (1982) treatment of indefinites in English, wA-words are treated not as quantifiers but as variables bound by the necessity operator, which in turn gives rise to the force of wide-scope universal quantification. Thus, (12) is interpreted as in (26). (26) Vx (x comes first -» x eats first)
In other words, the wA-word in the antecedent clause and the one in the consequent clause are both directly bound by the necessity operator. The wA-words share the same index and are thus anaphorically related to each other. The binding can be truly unselective in that the binder may bind distinct variables simultaneously. In this case the necessity operator has the force of a universal quantifier ranging over ordered pairs. The logical representation of (18) is as follows:
(27) Vx Vy ((x plays the role of y) -> (x resembles y))
We assume the necessity operator to be the default binder/licenser of the wA-words in bare conditionals without an overt adverb of quantification.
In those cases where an adverb of quantification is present, the adverb is the binder and licenser, and the quantificational force of the wA-word varies from one adverb to another. Thus the following sentences may be interpreted on a par with quantificational sentences containing determiners like most, some, and few, respectively. One question that may arise is why the wA-words cannot be caught by existential closure (Heim 1982 , Diesing 1992 , thereby obtaining existen tial force. The answer to this question centers around the properties of wA-words in Chinese. They are polarity items and thus need a licenser.
The natural licenser in a bare conditional is the necessity operator.8 Thus, the necessity operator in a conditional serves as the polarity licenser and the binder for the wA-words. Since the wA-words already have a binder, there According to our treatment, bare conditionals with wA-words are interpreted by universal quantification (in the default cases) involving an unselective binder that has scope over both the antecedent and consequent clauses.
We are now ready to give an explanation for the properties of bare condi there is no need for existential closure. However, it should be noted that the wA-words in bare conditionals are not generalized quantifiers even after they are licensed (as polarity items). In particular, the wA-words are interpreted as having universal force. The question of existential closure still arises, though it does not arise in cases of ruguo conditionals.
See also Diesing 1992. 10 The wordings in (31) are from Chierchia 1992. tion of the necessity operator and the consequent clause as the nuclear scope of the operator. In other words, (12a) roughly has the representation in (32) If the wA-words only appear in the antecedent clause, (33) will be violated.
That is, since the consequence clause is the nuclear scope of the operator, it must contain a variable for the operator to bind. Also, if the wh-word (s) only appear in the consequent clause, (33) again will be violated."
Pronouns, Empty Categories, and Definite Descriptions
Consider now the fact that the second wA-word in a bare conditional cannot be replaced by a pronoun, an empty category, or a definite description. In the case of a pronoun, since it is not interpreted as having independent reference, there are two possible interpretations: (i) as a bound variable or (ii) as an E-type pronoun. As a bound element, there are two possible binders: the necessity operator and the wA-word in the antecedent clause.
If the pronoun in the consequent clause is bound by the necessity operator, the ban against vacuous quantification is satisfied, but this also amounts to saying that the pronoun is a resumptive pronoun (i.e. a pronoun directly bound by an operator). We assume, however, that Chinese is like English in that it does not have true resumptive pronouns in the sense of Chao and Sells (1983) and Sells (1984) . In other words, in Chinese as in English, a pronoun cannot pick up its reference from an operator in A'-position.
Further, we take the view of Chomsky (1976) , Higginbotham (1980a,b) and much subsequent work that when a pronoun is interpreted as a bound variable, it is so interpreted in virtue of the fact that it takes a variable " An alternative way of looking at this is to say that the unselective binder is actually a polyadic quantifier, as proposed in Chierchia (1992 (1985) and Montalbetti (1984) , in order for a pronoun to be related refer entially to an operator, it must be possible to 'link' the pronoun to a variable that the operator locally binds.
Let us then consider if a pronoun in the consequent clause of a bare conditional can take as its antecedent, or be linked to, the wA-word (qua variable) in the antecedent clause: (Similarly, a bare conditional with a pronoun in the antecedent and a wh word in the consequent is ruled out because the pronoun cannot satisfy the requirement of restrictive quantification.)
As for treating the pronoun in bare conditionals as an E-type pronoun, it is clear from the above discussion on the necessity operator that this will lead to vacuous quantification -since the pronoun is not a variable.13
In fact, an E-type pronoun is also independently ruled out when it falls within the scope of its related operator. For example, in a sentence like 'A farmer who owns a lot of donkeys thinks he is rich' the pronoun he has only a bound-variable reading, but cannot be paraphrased as 'the farmer who owns a lot of donkeys'.14 Now consider the case where an empty category is used in place of a wh word in the consequent clause. If the empty category is an empty pronominal, it will lead to the same problems that we have just mentioned. On the other hand, if the empty category is a variable (granted that a variable can be base-generated), we treat it on a par with the parasitic gap examples in (36). Consider the contrast shown between (36) and (37) (33)).
We have now seen that the properties of bare conditionals can be naturally explained once these constructions are taken as cases of unselective binding in action. Even on an intuitive level, these properties are quite natural properties of the construction. The two variables required by restric tive, non-vacuous quantification are both directly, locally bound by their operator. Hence they are of equal status as true formal variables, neither dependent on the other. Since there is no direct anaphoric relationship between them, anaphoric expressions like pronouns and definite descrip tions are inappropriate.
Dou/Ruguo-Conditionals
Recall that doM/rngwo-conditionals present an opposite situation from the one we see in bare conditionals. There cannot be a wA-word in the conse quent clause. Instead, a pronoun, an empty category, or a definite description is used. Furthermore, the consequent clause need not contain any anaphoric element at all. In the analysis presented above, we appeal to an implicit operator for the universal force that the wA-words have. We will argue in this section that the wA-word in the antecedent clause in dou/ruguo conditionals is not bound by an operator external to the antecedent clause. Note that the representation (40c) satisfies the prohibition against vacuous 18 As an alternative, rather than treating the wA-word as a quantifier, we might still treat it as a variable "caught" by existential closure (Heim 1982 , Diesing 1992 in the absence of a binder ('if being merely a licenser).
The existential closure has scope internal to the t/-clause. If we follow Heim and Diesing and assume that in such cases no restrictive clause is needed, the relevant facts are also accounted for. We shall not pursue this option, so as to preserve a unified assumption of a tripartite structure for quantificational sentences. We have seen that, given our analysis of the wA-word as an existential quan tifier that takes scope over the antecedent clause, a complete tripartite structure can be obtained within the antecedent clause. This explains why there is no need for a second wA-word in the consequent clause. In fact, this also helps to explain why a w>A-word cannot appear in the consequent clause at all. Since the wA-word in the antecedent clause is already licensed as an existential quantifier in the antecedent clause, if there is another wh word in the consequent clause, that wA-word would need to have a licenser and a binder also. The only likely licenser and binder in such a case is the necessity operator. However, the presence of the necessity operator will lead to the problems we have just noted in section 3.1. That is, the tripartite structure formed in such a case will not have a variable in the restriction.21
The necessity operator, however, can be present. It does not bind the wA-word(s) in the antecedent clause since they are already bound and licensed. Instead, the necessity operator can range over cases or situations (see Berman 1987 and Heim 1990 Since the necessity operator binds a situation variable, it does not require another wA-word to be present in the consequent clause (i.e. the prohibi tion against vacuous quantification is satisfied).
One may ask why the necessity operator does not range over situations in bare conditionals. We think that in fact it does (see also footnote 13).
Recall that the necessity operator is an unselective/polyadic quantifier. It can bind many variables at the same time. Thus, in a bare conditional such as (12), the necessity operator can also range over situations. The reading will be roughly as in (45). (12) shei xian lai, shei xian chi who first come, who first eat 'If X comes first, X eats first.'
(45) For all (x, s(ituation)) (if x comes first in s), (x eats first in s).
In other words, the necessity operator in (12) binds a pair of variables, one of which is a situation variable.
E-type Pronouns.
We have explained why donkey anaphora in ruguo-conditionals cannot take the form of a w/i-word. From the same analysis it clearly also follows that the consequent clause need not contain any anaphoric element at all. However, our analysis allows anaphoric elements such as a pronoun, an empty category, or a definite description in the consequent clause. We propose that the pronoun in the consequent clause which refers to the wA-word is an E-type pronoun. In other words, a ruguo-conditional such as (23b) (repeated below) will have the inter pretation indicated in (46). This fact is consistent with the supposition that the pronoun in a ruguo conditional is an E-type pronoun.22
In ruguo-as well as ¿fou-conditionals, the pronoun can be replaced by an empty element or a definite description. The fact that it can be a definite description is not a surprise since that is exactly what the interpretation of an E-type pronoun is. As for empty elements, the pronoun can be replaced by an empty pronoun, though not as a variable. An empty pronoun will be just an empty version of an E-type pronoun. The empty element cannot be a variable, since a variable needs to be bound. Even though the neces sity operator can bind it, the binding will not create the right tripartite structure since there is no comparable variable in the restriction.
Note again that given our analysis, the unselective/polyadic binding cases are the ones in which the wA-words are independently bound by the neces sity operator. Each wA-word has an independent status as a variable, and none is anaphoric to another. In contrast, in the ruguo cases the elements in the consequent clause are dependent on the wA-words in the antecedent clause. Hence such elements must be anaphoric in form.
Dou-Conditionals
Dow-conditionals are similar to rwgwo-conditionals in that the consequent clause may contain a pronoun, an empty element, or a definite descrip tion, but cannot contain another wA-word. However, the interpretation of ¿/o«-conditionals differs from that of rwgHo-conditionals. In particular, i/oM-conditionals resemble the "unconditionals" that Zaefferer (1990) dis cusses. Zaefferer states that unconditionals strengthen a claim by stating "that it holds independent of the choice from some alternatively conceiv 22 The ungrammaticality of (48) may also be related to the licensing and binding of the wA-word shei in the expression meiyou shei, which is equivalent to 'no one'. able circumstances." We will discuss the formal properties of dou-condi tionals further below.
In dou-conditionals, the pronoun also cannot have a negative quantifi cational expression as an antecedent, which is consistent with an E-type pronoun analysis:
(49) *meiyou shei qiao men, ni dou jiao ta jinlai no-have who knock door you all ask him/her enter * 'If no one knocks on the door, you will then ask him/her to come in.'
Given the data we have seen, the wA-word in the antecedent clause of a dou conditional appears to be a quantifier. Is it a universal or an existential quantifier? The sentence below suggests that shei in the antecedent clause is existential, given the fact that the pronoun that follows it can take the singular form, paraphrasable as 'the*person you ask to come in':
(22b) ni jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou jian ta you ask who come in I all see him/her 'Whoever you ask to come in, I will see him/her (the person who you ask to come in).'
The truth condition of (22b) is roughly (50):
(50) For all x, x (a person you ask to come in), I will see x.
As mentioned earlier, an E-type pronoun taking a universal quantifier as its antecedent must be plural in form. We shall then treat dou-conditionals on a par with rwguo-conditionals as involving existential quantification internal to the antecedent clause, from which it follows that these two constructions share the same clustering of properties under consideration, in contrast to bare conditionals.
There is an important question, however, that stands in the way of treating ¿oM-conditionals in terms of existential quantification. As the truth condi tion of (50) is intended to show, the sentence has the force of universal quantification. It is true just in case on every assignment of the value of x such that you ask x to come in, I will see x; and it is false otherwise.
To ascertain the correctness of our assumption, we must first consider the role of dou more closely and resolve what now appears to be a contradic tion. it is commonplace knowledge that a polarity item in the scope of if has the status of an existential quantifier, it has also been commonly assumed in the literature that a wh-word to the left of dou (as in (51b)) is used as a universal quantifier.
We shall now argue that this latter assumption is incorrect, at least for the cases of ¿fow-conditionals under consideration. More specifically, we claim that the antecedent clause of a ¿/ow-conditional is an elliptical phrase containing an embedded question. As an embedded question, the 'antecedent clause' is then interpreted as having the force of existential quantifica tion, given the standard semantics of questions. The donkey pronoun or definite description refers to the wA-word qua existential quantifier. The similarities between ruguo-and dow-conditionals then follow straight forwardly. As for the adverb dou, which triggers universal quantification, we argue that it quantifies over the set of propositions that is the denota tion of the question (see Hamblin 1973; cf. Harttunen 1977 , Engdahl 1986 , Lahiri 1991 . There is then no contradiction in saying that JoM-conditionals involve both existential and universal quantification. forgive him/her 'Regardless of why he didn't show up, I won't forgive him/her.'
The well-formedness of (55) rogative sense of the wA-word in the antecedent clause is not possible. In addition, as mentioned earlier, ¿ou-conditionals appear to resemble a certain type of conditionals called "unconditionals" by Zaefferer (1990) . Zaefferer notes that "unconditionals seem to be encoded in most languages by inter rogative clauses, more precisely by alternative and constituent inter rogatives" (p. 489). The reason why languages tend to use interrogatives in unconditionals, according to Zaefferer, is that interrogatives "define sets of issues ...
as representing exhaustively the range of options that are currently taken into considerations," and that it is the exhaustiveness that lead to the unconditional interpretations.
Recapitulating, then, in a ¿on-conditional there is universal quantifica tion ranging over the set of propositions that define the embedded question in the antecedent clause. At the same time, since interrogative wA-words have the status of an existential quantifier having scope internal to the embedded question, an interrogative phrase in such a construction will undergo wA-movement into the Spec of the embedded clause and have scope over it (as in the tradition of Huang 1982). Thus the consequent clause may contain an overt or covert E-type pronoun or a definite description (or it may contain no such element at all), but it crucially cannot contain another wA-word. This range of properties falls out in the same way as those observed with rngwo-conditionals.
Apparent Alternations
In section 2 we saw data from Yu (1965) which indicate possible alterna tions between a wA-word and a pronoun in bare conditionals. The examples are repeated below as (57): (57) a. shei yao zhe puo-chang, wo jiu rang gei who want this broken-factory I then give to talshei him(her)/who 'Whoever wants this broken factory, I'll give it to him/her.' b. shei bu dui, wo jiu shuo talshei bu dui who not right I then say he(she)/who not right 'Whoever is not right, I'll say that he/she is not right.'
In these two examples, donkey anaphora can be expressed with either a wA-word or a pronoun. As they stand, these examples are problematic to the analysis presented above. In contrast to these data, we have found that We will argue here that the apparent alternation is due to the possi bility of omitting ruguo 'if' in ruguo-conditionals. First, we have observed above that these unexpected alternations are found only where the second clause contains the element jiu 'then'. With a "completely bare" conditional (with neither ruguo nor jiu), no alternation is allowed ( (21) In (58b), we see that the leading element ruguo 'if in a rwgwo-conditional can be optional. We will call such a conditional a "reduced" ruguo-condi tional. There is no meaning difference between (58a) and (58b). Crucially, (58b) is interpreted as a conditional. Hence, based on (58b) and the possibility of having jiu 'if' in a bare conditional, sentences such as (58) can be ambiguous between a "reduced" rwguo-conditional and a bare conditional. In other words, in these examples, when the donkey pronoun is in a w/z-form, we are dealing with a bare conditional, and when it is an anaphoric pronoun, we are dealing with a "reduced" rugwo-conditional.
Furthermore, in examples such as (57), when an anaphoric pronoun is used, it has to be in the singular form, as in (59), showing that we are dealing with a wh-word with existential force in the antecedent clause. (59a,b) further confirm our analysis that (57) is a "reduced" ruguo-condi tional; the wh-word does not have universal force. In short, there is in fact no "alternation." The examples in (57) are simply realizations of an ambiguity between bare conditionals with jiu 'then' and "reduced" ruguo conditionals.
Mixed Cases
The data we have presented so far involve sentences that use either the unselective binding strategy or the E-type pronoun strategy. As sentences (60)- (61) show, a mixed strategy may also be used: In both (60) and (61), the subject of the consequent clause is an overt pronoun. However, the objects in the antecedent clause and the conse quent clause are wA-words. We consider these to be mixed cases, which use both the unselective binding strategy (object) and the E-type strategy (subject). The latter strategy is possible because the sentences may be analyzed as nrgwo-conditionals with jiu 'then'. As noted earlier, when jiu 'then' is absent, the conditionals are 'completely bare'. In these mixed cases, jiu 'then' cannot be absent: In these grammatical mixed cases, the non-overt ruguo 'if' can pick one or more NPs to license. In the examples we have seen, ruguo 'if' only picks one NP (the subject) to license and thus the subject in the antecedent clause is existential.
The option of licensing only the subject as existential leaves the object wA-word unlicensed. In this case the necessity operator comes in as an unselective binder and licenser, giving it universal force. Thus, the object wA-words in these mixed cases have universal force. As shown in these examples, the related NP used in the consequent clause can be an anaphoric pronoun if it corresponds to an existential wA-word. In contrast, since the object wA-word in the antecedent clause is licensed and bound by the necessity operator, the related NP in the consequent clause can only be in the form of a wA-word. 25 We have proposed that in these mixed cases, there is a non-overt ruguo 'if'. It should be noted that if ruguo is overt, mixed cases are not allowed, as shown in (64). Thus, it appears that the presence of overt ruguo 'if' blocks the licensing and binding of the wA-words from the necessity operator. Given a sentence such as (64), even though ruguo can license the subject and the object wA-words in the antecedent clause, the object wA-word in the consequent clause cannot be licensed. (i) shows that there is a subject-object asymmetry in mixed cases. The sentence differs from the other grammatical mixed cases in that the NP that is being licensed by the non-overt ruguo 'if' is the object rather than the subject.
We tentatively surmise that this is a locality/ minimality effect on licensing. If licensing is done from top to bottom and cannot skip, then we would not expect the object to be licensed but not the subject. (65) Every (most, etc.) person who has a dime will put it in the meter. (Pelletier and Schubert 1989) (66) Every man who owned a slave owned his/her offspring.
In (65), a V reading would mean that every man will put every dime he has into the meter. But this reading is in fact the least likely reading we
get. An unselective binding analysis which treats (65) as universal quan tification over person-dime pairs fails to exclude this reading. On the other hand, the classic donkey sentence can have either the V or the 3 reading, depending on the context (see Chierchia 1992 for details).
In the two types of donkey sentences discussed in this paper, we can see a contrast in terms of V and 3 readings. In particular, the bare condi tionals only have the V reading, while the rwguo-conditionals can have either the 3 reading or the V reading. Further, in dou-conditionals, due to the presence of dou 'all', we have a situation in which the wh-word is exis tentially quantified but the sentence also exhibits a V reading.
Bare Conditionals
In our analysis of bare conditionals, the wA-words are each locally bound by a necessity operator which provides universal force. According to this analysis, all the wA-words in a bare conditional are interpreted univer sally. Consider now the sentence in (67) The truth condition of (67) is roughly:
(68) For all x, x a person you like, I will like X.
The truth condition of (67) requires that I like all the people that you like.
In particular, the sentence is false if you like four people but I only like three of them. (69) and (70) shows that 7-ugwo-conditionals differ from dow-conditionals in that the latter yield a V reading. The truth condition of (69) In contrast, the truth condition of (70) does not require that all friends of yours be introduced to Lisi. As long as one of them is introduced, the sentence will be true. The logical representation of (70) is (72). (72) For some x, x a friend of yours, I will introduce x to Lisi.
Note that it is also possible to have a V reading in this case. In such a inite. The variability can be observed equally well when the adverbs simply quantify over situations (see also footnote 2). In Chierchia (1992) , it suggested that the V reading comes from the E-type pronoun strategy. We have seen that the unselective/polyadic binding strategy also has the V reading. In fact, it is this type of strategy which has consistent V readings. In contrast, in the E-type pronoun strategy cases, both V readings and 3 readings are possible. Hence, it appears that the E-type pronoun strategy does not entail V readings only and V readings are not particular to the E-type pronoun strategy.
The Proportion Problem
Another controversial area in donkey anaphora has to do with the 'pro portion problem' and the distribution of symmetric and asymmetric readings. The problem has to do with whether an adverb of quantification is anchored to one or all of the indefinites in a given sentence:
(74) If a fanner owns a donkey, he is usually rich.
Consider a scenario with 100 farmers, 99 of whom each own one donkey and are poor and the 100th of whom owns 200 donkeys and is rich.
Following the terminology of Kadmon, the symmetric reading is the one according to which the adverb is anchored to both a farmer and a donkey,
i.e., to minimal situations where exactly one farmer owns exactly one donkey. Thus according to this reading, the-sentence is purported to assert that in most cases involving a minimal farmer-donkey pair, the farmer is rich. For the scenario under consideration, the sentence is purported to be true because it asserts that of the 299 farmer-donkey pairs, most (200) pairs involve a rich farmer. The subject-asymmetric reading is the one in which the adverb is anchored to a farmer, to situations that are minimal with respect to the farmers (exactly one farmer who owns one or more donkeys).
In the current scenario the sentence is purported to be false because it asserts that of the 100 farmer-donkey pairs, more than half involve a poor farmer.
In an object-asymmetric reading, the adverb would be anchored to situa tions that are minimal with respect to the donkeys only (exactly one donkey which is owned by one or more farmers). The fact is that for a sentence like (74), the subject-asymmetric reading is (almost) the only reading available (as speakers have no problem judging the sentence to be false under the current scenario). The problem is whether this fact can be pre dicted by a proper theory of indefinites, such as unselective binding or the E-type strategy.
We agree with Heim (1990) and Chierchia (1992) in believing that the proportion problem does not directly rest on the choice between unselec tive binding and the E-type analysis. As Chierchia (1992) In all of these cases, if there is a topic specified, the sentence becomes asymmetric with respect to the topic. Take (75) for instance. If the speaker first says "with respect to the characters (roles) in this play," then the reading will be asymmetric with respect to the roles. Thus, the example shows that topic choice is relevant, as Chierchia (1992) points out. To illustrate more explicitly, consider the case where a topic is specified and there are 10 actors, with 9 of them each playing one role while the tenth actor plays 10 roles. If all nine actors play their single role well while the tenth actor does not play any of his roles well, then the sentence will come out false. In contrast, if the topic is the actors, then such a scenario will yield a true sentence. The same holds of dou-and rwgwo-conditionals as well.
It is in fact also possible to get a symmetric reading, if an explicit topic is indicated, say with respect to minimal actor-role pairs. (A scenario that would distinguish the symmetric reading from both asymmetric readings would be one in which some actors may play more than one role, and some roles may each be played by more than one actor.) Though it may be easier to obtain the subject-asymmetric reading in all these cases, we assume that this is due to the fact that subjects tend to be taken as the implicit topic in the absence of an overt topic. In the latter two cases
( (76)- (77)), this may also be due to the presence of an anaphoric pronoun in the consequent clause.
Comparing with Correlatives
Although we have analyzed the bare conditionals in Chinese as cases of unselective binding, it has occurred to us that these constructions bear considerable resemblance to the correlative construction in Hindi and other related languages.26 To readers familiar with this construction it may have been tempting to assimilate the analysis of bare conditionals to what best accounts for correlatives. We argue here that, in spite of superficial simi larities, bare conditionals are not correlatives. We show that they differ in several important respects, which strongly argue for treating them in dif ferent ways.
Structural Difference
First of all, note that bare conditionals do not bear any remote structural resemblance to typical relative clauses in Chinese. As is well known, a relative clause in Chinese must be attached to the modification marker de, as shown in (78). Furthermore, the relative clause precedes its head. time. Note that this difference also corresponds with the fact that only the bare conditional may take the adverb jiu 'then' in the consequent, but the correlative cannot. Posteriority is a characteristic property of the consequent clause of a conditional sentence, but not a property of a relativized con struction.
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Readings
It has been pointed out by Kadmon (1990) and Heim (1990) There is abundant evidence, then, that bare conditionals are genuine con ditionals, and not instances of a "Chinese version" of the correlative construction.
Conclusion
In this study we have seen that there are two paradigms of donkey sentences in Chinese, which exhibit systematic syntactic differences with respect to the distribution of w/j-words and anaphoric NPs. We showed that these otherwise puzzling properties find a natural explanation in general, inde pendently motivated principles once they are treated in terms of unselec tive binding and an E-type analysis, respectively. In line with Heim (1990) we believe that considerations of uniqueness and of the proportion problem do not argue for the adoption of unselective binding in addition to the more traditional E-type analysis. But given the systematic differences observed between the two sentence types in Chinese, there is reason to resurrect the unselective binding mechanism as part of Universal Grammar -though, somewhat ironically, not for the kind of sentences in English that led to Heim's proposal of the mechanism in the first place. We showed that this 'mixed' approach accounts for further differences between the two paradigms with respect to V and 3 readings. Finally, we showed that bare conditionals and correlative constructions, though they share certain superficial similarities, must be distinguished and treated as two different
species. An obvious corollary of our paper is that indefinites that are lexically unspecified with respect to their quantificational force can be either vari ables or true quantifiers, depending on the availability of each use in a context or language, but not on observed quantificational variability alone.
Once each use is determined, however, other properties of donkey sentences will follow, as required by independent principles of grammar. Another corollary is that all wA-words are not equal in Chinese (contrary to what Aoun and Li (1993) and others assume). Some are unselectively bound, but others are moved (under QR or LF wA-movement). In fact, even exactly the same wA-word may or may not be moved at LF, depending on whether it occurs in the environment of a bare, a ruguo-or a dou-conditional.27
This conclusion is needed if we assume that quantification is restrictive and non-vacuous, and that it involves a tripartite structure consistently. In the ruguo-and dow-conditionals in particular, a tripartite structure is created by moving a quantifier nuclear scope and mapping its N' onto a restric tion (cf. Diesing 1992) . The relevant movement may be QR, and possibly wA-movement as well, especially in cases of dow-conditionals involving 'why' or 'A-not-A' that do not have a non-interrogative interpretation.
27 The determining factor is clearly not whether a given wft-word is D-linked or non-D linked in the sense of Pesetsky (1987) .
